Contents: Introduction. 1. The challenge of unconventional warfare. 2. Historical background--context. 3. Organizational theory and processes of innovation. 4. Why can't the United States conduct unconventional warfare? Implications of contingency theory. 5. Why can't the United States conduct unconventional warfare? Implications of processes innovation. 6. Conclusions and recommendations. Notes. Bibliography. Index.
"In this book, Rothstein presents an authoritative overview of the current American way of war and addresses the specific causes of the "conventionalization" of U.S. special forces, using the war in Afghanistan as a case study. He draws a distinction between special operations and unconventional warfare, reminding us that the use of special forces does not automatically make the fighting unconventional, and the questions the ability of U.S. forces to effectively defeat irregular threats. In conclusion, the author suggests ways to regain lost unconventional warfare capacity." (jacket)